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THE WEST VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION
REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF
JURY TO VERDICTS IN CIVIL ACTIONS, ABOLISHING
LAW OF UNANIMOUS CONSENT-
JUIAAN F. BoucaEgE**
I believe it may be safely asserted that the overwhelming
majority of nisi prius judges of limited or extensive experience
gives sanction to the sentiment expressed by the late Chief Justice
Lamm of Missouri: "The invention of a jury to weigh and de-
termine the credit due to human testimony, and settle facts in
doubt or dispute in a trial at law, is to be rightly taken as one of
the splendid achievements of civilized man. While not ideally per-
fect, trial by jury has stood the test of use and justifies itself as
indispensable. A jury trial is the most cherished, if not the most
' aluable, institution we have derived from our Saxon ancestors."
I believe, too, that the same body of practical, hard-working
administrators of the law will accord approval to Blackstone's
pronouncement, "Trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever
will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law ... A com-
petent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from
among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators
of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice. It is the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for,
that he cannot be affected, either in his property, his liberty, or his
person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors
and equals."
Time, and, in fact, experience in many jurisdictions other than
ours, have proven the need of some modification of the last clause,
"that the subject cannot be affected in his property but by the
navimous consent of twelve of his neighbors." Blackstone states
that, "The necessity of a total unanimity seems to be peculiar to
our own Constitution." His annotator, Chitty, observes, "The
unanimity of twelve men, so repugnant to all experience of human
conduct, passions and understandings, could hardly in any age
have been introduced into practice by a deliberate act of the Legis-
* Part I of an address delivered at the fifth annual meeting of the West
Virginia Judicial Association, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, Octo-
ber 16, 1941. Parts I and III will appear in forthcoming issues of the
Qutarterly.
I5*Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of West Virginia and President
of the West Virginia Judicial Association.
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lature. But that the life, and perhaps the liberty and property of
a subject, should not be affected by the concurring judgment of a
less number than twelve, where more were present, was a law
founded in reason and caution; and seems to be transmitted to us
by the common law, or from immemorial antiquity." It is stated,
however, by Professor Thayer, quoted in Bouvier, "Unanimity
in giving verdict was not universal in the early days of the com-
mon law; at times eleven sufficed; in some cases a majority. Prob-
ably it was only in the second half of the fourteenth century that
unanimity became an established principle." And the same
author quotes Pollock, Expansion of Common Law: "The rule of
unanimity of the jury was not fixed before the 14th century and
it was probably never laid down in terms that juries must be
unanimous. What was actually decided was that the verdict of
fewer than twelve men would not suffice, and it became a fixed
custom to have that number of the petit jury."
So, it seems the reasons for the selection of twelve as the
original trial jury and whether this number should return their
"unanimous consent" are much beclouded in the mists of "im-
memorial antiquity."
Article III, Section 13 of our own Constitution preserves the
right of trial by jury in suits at common law, but is silent as to
the number who shall comprise the jury. Construing this section,
the Supreme Court of Appeals said, in Lovings v. Norfolk & IV.
Ry., "It means and can only mean the common law jury of twelve
good and lawful men. . . . 'In case of trial by the petit jury it can
be by no more nor less than twelve, and all assenting to the ver-
dict.' "
Section 14 of our Bill of Rights provides expressly 'for a jury
of twelve in the trial of crimes and misdemeanors.
A. P. Herbert, the English author, in his entertaining volume
of satire and sound common sense, Uncommon Law, refreshingly
melodramatizes the requirement of unanimous verdicts:
"THE JUDGE : Sir Ethelred, will there be any charge for
your lecture on the jury system?
"SIR ETHELRED: No, milord. Milord, I was just coming
to the present case. Look at it! It's lasted a fortnight. The
most complicated dispute in my experience. The documents
were a mile high when we began; and they now measure three,
for the reports of the proceedings in this Court amount to
two....
147 W. Va. 582, 35 S. E. 962 (1900).
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"All about debentures and mergers and mortgages and
subsidiary companies -twenty-five subsidiary companies on
one side alone! Not to mention the expert evidence about the
scientific stuff -all that fandango about the magnesium
alkaloid and the patent vapour-feed. The chemists on the
two sides flatly contradicted each other, and so did the ac-
countants. I don't believe there's an accountant on either side
who really knows what some of the figures mean; I don't be-
lieve there's a single person in this Court-
"THE JUDGE: There is one person in this court, Sir
Ethelred, who has'a firm grasp of the whole case.
"SIR BTHELRED: I beg your Lordship's pardon. Cer-
tainly, milord. But, milord, with great respect, that rather
bears out - ah - what I was saying - ah - for that one per-
son, milord, as this is a jury case, will not have to answer the
important questions in the case. You, milord, have had the
advantage at every stage of this protracted bicker of seeing
the shorthand reports of the previous day's proceedings, with
copies of the material documents, diagrams, maps, schedules,
balance-sheets, accounts, and so forth. So milord, have me
learned friend and myself, each of whom is attended by a
small cloud of solicitors and junior counsel. We are all three
possessed of exceptional intelligence and are equipped by long
training and practice for the rapid understanding of complex
figures and affairs; and if at any moment we are in doubt we
can request each other or our advisers for information and
assistance. Yet you will recall, milord, how often we have
found ourselves-sometimes all three of us-in an incontest-
able fog about some vital point, exactly what a witness said
or a correspondent wrote, the date of an interview, the amount
of a cheque or bribe, the wording of a formula, the position of a
building; and how many minutes we have spent each day upon
excavating the forgotten facts from the desert of documents
with which we are surrounded....
"How, I say, can you (the jury) be expected to get a
grip of this colossal conundrum without the assistance of any
documents at all? No shorthand notes, no maps, no accounts,
except now and then when his Lordship decides it is time you
were given a bone to play with, and we let you have a hasty
glance at a diagram that doesn't matter. The whole thing's
fantastic! There you sit on your hard seats, with scarcely
room to wriggle, wondering what it is all about. Decent fel-
lows, I dare say, some of you, but with no particular in-
telligence or financial training, and wildly divergent in char-
acter and opinion. And presently his Lordship will ask you
to answer-and answer unaninously- about seventeen ex-
tremely unanswerable questions: 'Did the defendant knowing-
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ly make a false assertion?' and so forth. How the deuce do
you know? You don't even know when you've made a false
assertion yourselves. And wnawimous! I look at you, twelve
good men and true- or rather, ten good men and true and
two women- and I try to think of any simple subject about
which the twelve of you would be likely to agree unanimously
if you were assembled together by chance in any place out-
side this Court; at a dinner-party, on a committee. The sim-
plest questions of fact, morals, ethics, history, arithmetic-
and you'd be all over the shop. And yet when we shut you
up in a cold room with nothing to eat you can arrive at unani-
mous decisions about questions that baffle the wisest brains of
the Bench and Bar."
What trial judge sometine in his experience has not fretted
at the requirement of a unanimous verdict in the trial of civil
actions? Frequently hung juries by reason of the self-opinionated,
if not downright stubbornness of one or two jurors unwilling and
refusing to consider the views of fellow jurors; or because of the
social, fraternal or business ties to and relations with parties
litigant or counsel; animosity or extreme friendliness towards mat-
erial witnesses, and many other improper and illogical reasons.
Moreover, a cause of fret to the court is found in juries often con-
suming unnecessary and unreasonable time in agreeing upon a
verdict; and frequently returning inadequate and sometimes
nominal verdicts. All of these undesirable features and factors
could be obviated by abolishing the unanimity rule. I am quite
certain every trial judge could cite instances of the results referred
to. and that his impatience therewith would not brand him as
skeptical of the beneficence of the jury system. During the prepa-
ration of the manuscript of this address, there came to me from
the West Publishing Company, as no doubt was sent to most mem-
bers of the bar, the picture of The Hung Jury, so typical of the
point here made, revealing one old bewhiskered apotheosis of ada-
mantine obstinacy. This picture I have had framed and placed upon
the wall of the jury room of my court. Permit me to instance one
case recently beard before me:
An action against a small loan company and two of its agents
or "adjusters" for the alleged suicide of a customer of the loan
company while in a deranged mental state, occasioned by assault
upon him by the two adjusters while on a visit to his home to col-
lect a delinquency or to reclaim pledged personal property. The
deceased had worked steadily for a period of twenty years for a
glass company and had been promoted to a. position of some re-
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sponsibility, but, like so many of his class, chronically in debt, and
ill the toils of the particular loan company fourteen years. There
survived him a widow and eight children ranging in age from
nine months to twenty-one years.
Upon instructions to the jury, as I conceived the law, it re-
turned a verdict for $2,500.00. Information was unsolicitedly
given me that ten of the jury were in favor of returning a verdict
in amounts varying from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00, but that two were
not so liberal, not desiring to give anything, and that one of the
two and his wife were close friends and bridge-playing com-
panions of one of the individual defendants, and, of course, one of
those whose alleged wrongful acts involved the loan company. Had
the unanimity rule not been in force, there would in all likelihood
have been a verdict of from $7,500.00 to $10,000.00 in this case,
which assuredly would not have been excessive. While the time
for application for a writ of error to the judgment rendered here
has not expired, I feel free to comment thereon as I have been
reliably informed that the judgment has been paid.
After nearly five years service as presiding judge of a court
whose doors are required to be open fifty-two weeks of the year to
receive a constant flow of matters of original jurisdiction and no
inconsiderable volume of appellate matters, as well as some pre-
vious service as special judge of the same and of a court of con-
current jurisdiction, I am firmly of the opinion that justice will be
more e-peditiously, more inexpensively, more fairly administered in
the trial of civil cases by-requiring the consent of only three-fourths
of a jury of twelve to a verdict. This, of course, can be brought
about only by a constitutional amendment.
Twenty-seven states still require unanimous verdicts in civil
cases; fourteen require three-fourths verdicts; six require five-
sixths, and one state two-thirds. New York was first of the
original states to depart from the unanimity rule, it requiring five-
sixths. Reform in practice in this respect, and I hold such to be
reform, has been brought about largely in the western states. In
the great majority changes were effected by constitutional pro-
visions.
The constitutions of New Mexico and Texas permit verdicts
in civil cases by less than a unanimous vote, but the Legislatures
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are given authority to require unanimous verdicts, and statutes in
each of these states require such.
Minnesota has the unique and peculiar provision for a unani-
mous verdict but, after twelve hours of deliberation, the agreement
of five-sixths of the jury shall be sufficient to return a verdict.
A small majority of the states, it will be noted, retain the re-
quirement of the unanimous verdict.
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Code 1928, § 3823 3/4
Const., art. I, § 7 3/4
Gen. Stat. 1930, § 5656 3/4
Const., art. I, § 7 5/6
Code 1935, § 11483 Bare Majority
Carr. Stat 1936, § 2268 3/4
Code of Prac. 1932, § 522 3/4
Minn. Stat. 1927, § 9301
Miss. Code 1930, § 2067
Const., art. II, § 32
Const., arxt. III, § 23
Comp. Stat. 1929, § 20-1125
Const., art. I, § 3
Const., art. I, § 2
Civ. Prac. 1937, § 463-a
Gen. Code 1938, § 11420-9
Const., art. II, § 19
Const., art. VII, § 18
Comp. Laws of 1929:
§ 2515- Circuit Courts
§ 2516- Justice Courts
Const., art. I, § 10
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UNANIMOUS VERDICT UNANIMOUS VERDICT NOT
REQUIRED REQUIRED
Virginia X
Washington Rem. Code 1932, § 358 3/4
West Virginia X
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. 1937, § 270.25 5/6
Wyoming X
TOTALS 27 is
3 Qualified 3 Qualified
* These six states apparently never required unanimous verdicts in civil cases.
: In Mnnesota, if verdict returned within 12 hours' deliberation, it must
be unanimous; after 12 hours' deliberation, it may be by a 5/6 vote.
** The Constitutions of New Mexico and Texas permit verdicts in civil cases
by less than a unanimous vote of the jury, but the Legislatures are given
authority by the Constitutions to require unanimous verdicts, and by statutes
in both states unanimous verdicts are required.
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